‘Welfare worries’: mapping the directions of welfare futures in the contemporary UK by Mooney, Gerry & Neal, Sarah
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
‘Welfare worries’: mapping the directions of welfare
futures in the contemporary UK
Journal Item
How to cite:
Mooney, Gerry and Neal, Sarah (2010). ‘Welfare worries’: mapping the directions of welfare futures in the
contemporary UK. Research, Policy and Planning, 27(3) pp. 141–150.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2010 Social Services Research Group
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://ssrg.org.uk/research-policy-and-planning-volume-27/
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Research, Policy and Planning (2009/10) 27(3), 141-150 
‘Welfare worries’: mapping the directions of welfare futures in the 
contemporary UK 
 
Gerry Mooney and Sarah Neal 
 
Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The state of welfare 
 
If you were to open and read any newspaper 
or switch on and watch television news or 
read-watch online news in any day at any 
given time in any given week there would 
be a story, incident or crisis about welfare in 
some shape or form. Often the presence of 
welfare within the busy overcrowded spaces 
of the public domain relates to an anxiety 
about and/or a failure of welfare delivery 
and service impact. Usually it is both 
combined. For example, at the time of 
writing there is, in England, a news headline 
scandal about the poor standards of 
cleanliness in some foundation hospitals 
being such that they are contributing to the 
further ill-health and death of those people 
receiving medical treatment and healthcare. 
The scandal is not just about the lack of 
hygiene in the hospitals. The scandal is 
amplified because some of the hospitals 
involved had been checked by the NHS 
inspection system and passed as being of 
good and satisfactory standard. This is the 
double anxiety – the failure of the service 
and the failure of the monitoring of the 
service. 
 
The compacted and multiple natures of 
welfare challenges and welfare anxieties in 
the contemporary UK (although this is not a 
nationally bounded anxiety), relate to sets of 
connections and often entrenched lacunae. 
Another example: in North London, the 
death of ‘Baby P’ in 2007 and subsequent 
enquiry, trial and conviction is about the 
horrors of violence against and harm of a 
child within the private spaces of families. 
The gap or lacuna here is, of course, 
between the endangered child and child 
protection. Baby P is about the failure of 
safeguarding systems but the connection is 
that the case has very direct implications in 
terms of the recruitment, training and 
retention of social workers (see Ferguson & 
Lavalette, 2009). For example, Ed Balls 
who, at the time of writing, is Secretary of 
State for Children, Schools and Families, 
argues that, in social work, there “are high 
referral rates [of children] very high 
vacancy rates [of social worker posts] and a 
lot of variation in performance” (The 
Guardian, November 28, 2009). In other 
words, the few remaining and overworked 
social workers are fearful of mistakenly 
allowing children to stay within families and 
disproportionately referring them to state 
care systems. Ed Balls sees this situation as 
a result of the quality of welfare 
professionals themselves: “in the end this is 
a profession [social work] that has not 
retained the best people at the frontline for 
fundamental reasons about training, 
employment, pay”. For the Minister, the 
answer to this welfare crisis appears to lie in 
creating more rigorous and higher status 
‘Royal College’ professional training and 
‘bundling’ social workers with teachers, 
doctors and the police. 
 
The dirty hospitals and the Baby Peter 
scandal are two distinct crises of welfare 
narratives that demonstrate some of the 
worries, contradictions and complexities of 
welfare in late modern societies. The 
common thread through them is the failure 
to protect the vulnerable and at risk and the 
failure of the various welfare checking 
systems to see the welfare failure. 
 
However, there is another recurring 
ideology which circulates around and works 
to shape crises of welfare narratives: an 
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explicit anti-welfare perspective that draws 
on a century and more-old distinction 
between a ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
poor which, in the increasingly pervasive 
language of the early 21st century, talks of 
aspirational deficits, dysfunctional and 
deviant behaviours, an absence of social 
capital and a seemingly expanding range of 
moral and behavioural problems which have 
some of the poorest sections of 
contemporary UK society trapped in a, now 
rediscovered, culture of poverty. 
 
If the Baby Peter case and stories of falling 
hospital standards speak to particular crises 
of welfare around service delivery and the 
failure of social services to provide care and 
security for the very young, the Karen 
Matthews episode speaks to other crises of 
welfare. Matthews’ (and her partner’s) 
conviction for the kidnapping of her nine 
year old daughter in Dewsbury, West 
Yorkshire in 2008, provoked a backlash 
which has all the hallmarks of a right-wing 
moral panic. Speaking shortly after their 
sentencing in December 2008, Conservative 
leader David Cameron commented that: 
 
The verdict last week on Karen Matthews 
and her vile accomplice is also a verdict 
on our broken society. The details are 
damning. A fragmented family held 
together by drink, drugs and deception. 
An estate where decency fights a losing 
battle against degradation and despair. 
A community whose pillars are crime, 
unemployment and addiction. How can 
Gordon Brown argue that people who 
talk about a broken society are wrong? 
These children suffered at the very 
sharpest end of our broken society but all 
over the country are other young victims, 
too. Children whose toys are Dad’s 
discarded drink bottles; whose role 
models are criminals, liars and 
layabouts; whose innocence is lost before 
their first milk tooth. What chance for 
these children? Raised without manners, 
morals or a decent education, they’re 
caught up in the same destructive chain 
as their parents. It’s a chain that links 
unemployment, family breakdown, debt, 
drugs and crime’. (David Cameron, 
Daily Mail, December 8, 2008) 
 
In the Charles Murray-esque landscape 
conjured up by Cameron a particular anti-
welfare message is being invited. This 
invitation is that existing forms of welfare 
provision have not only failed to make any 
effective interruption in the ‘destructive 
chain’ but that they have been, more 
damningly, contributive and even causal of 
it. While Cameron’s term the ‘broken 
society’ may be new, the state of the poor 
and the responsibility of poor people for the 
state they exist in is an old and persistent 
argument that has always been able to find a 
ready audience in sections of the popular 
media and among politicians across the 
political spectrum, and of course among 
some in policy-making and academic 
communities. 
 
Such explanatory narratives are powerful. 
They offer an immediate and easy apparatus 
for making sense of inequality and human 
behaviour in complex social worlds. In the 
contemporary, intensely 24/7-mediated UK 
these narratives are particularly potent and 
work effectively precisely because the 
evidence that substantiates them – the Karen 
Mathews story for example – is so widely 
disseminated and deliberated on. In thinking 
about arguments about the future formations 
of welfare provision, what is clear is that the 
media will be involved and influential. 
Indeed, we suggest that it is important to 
acknowledge the media as a key policy 
player in social policy setting agendas and 
policy-making networks (Neal, 2003; 
McLaughlin & Neal, 2004). Given this, the 
future directions of welfare need to attend to 
the ways in which these media engagements 
inform, underpin, disseminate and challenge 
some of the dominant welfare narratives that 
are being valorised in Britain today. 
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Fear and distrust in early twenty-
first century Britain 
 
The three cases we have highlighted thus far 
all relate in different ways to a generalised 
sense that welfare is failing, and that the 
state is now failing to protect us from a 
seemingly growing and expanding range of 
social harms and risks in an increasingly 
precarious and uncertain time. Minton 
(2008; 2009) has talked of Britain as a 
‘distrustful and fearful society’. This 
modern ‘social evil’, she claims, results 
from growing social and geographical 
inequalities and from a media which has a 
vested commercial interest in promoting 
fear and insecurity. Minton is only one of a 
number of commentators who have 
highlighted the growing social and 
economic polarisation in contemporary 
Britain and the ways in which this 
corresponds with and contributes to rising 
levels of fear, distrust and anxiety (Young, 
2007; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). For 
Minton, such inequalities are more and 
more visible, inscribed on the social 
landscape of Britain today. They are 
reflected in the twin and related processes of 
deepening social and economic segregation 
and homogenisation of communities. The 
Moorside estate where the Matthews 
kidnapping took place is not one, but many 
worlds apart, from the increasingly 
privatised and segregated enclaves of 
affluence that exist in parts of urban, 
suburban and rural Britain. 
 
Minton is by no means the first 
commentator to suggest that late modernity 
is characterised by the failure of the 
modernist project. For Minton and others, 
there is a ‘late modern relationship’ which 
can be broadly aligned and understood in 
the following way: increasing social and 
economic polarisation = increasing social 
fear and mistrust = ontological insecurity = 
social retreat and individual securitisation. 
The failures of the welfare state in the 
modernist project are reflected and inflected 
in the shape that welfare’s future forms are 
likely to take. For example, in his seminal 
text The Exclusive Society (1999, p.4) the 
social theorist Jock Young reminds us that, 
for the modernist project, its ‘ideal’ 
intention was, “the greater and greater 
incorporation of the population into full 
citizenship … of substantive incorporation 
into society … of not only legal and 
political rights but social rights: a minimum 
of employment, income, education, health 
and housing”. While this clearly was never 
part of its actual achievement, what Young 
reminds us of is the extent to which there 
was a moment of consensual politics as to 
the desirability of this. The passing of this 
intention and consensus in a haze of global 
economic restructuring, neo-liberalism, 
political dissolutions and realignments, 
migrations, new social movements, 
individualism, choice, consumerism, and so 
forth means that these intentions appear as 
far out of reach in the first decades of the 
21st century as seemed within reach in the 
mid 20th century. 
 
The failures and limitations of the ‘Golden 
Age’ welfare settlements became apparent 
as some groups were excluded from welfare 
entitlements, as welfare recipients became 
stigmatised and as social inequality, 
differentiation and poverty continued and, 
indeed, increased. It was in this context that 
modernist welfare intentions gave way to 
neo-liberalism. With its combined emphasis 
on less state provision, more markets, more 
individual responsibility, on pathologised 
poverty and ‘difficult’ populations, neo-
liberalism became a key shaper of welfare 
approaches and transformations in Britain, 
the USA and other Anglophone countries 
from the late 1970s. The ascendancy of neo-
liberalism and its successive discourses has 
meant that it has become increasingly 
popular to think of the end of state welfare 
or, at the very least, of an era of the decline 
of the welfare state. However, despite the 
influence of the neo-liberal agenda in 
welfare politics the ‘end of welfare’ is too 
general, too US/UK - and, perhaps, here 
with the latter case, maybe too England -
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specific and too simplistic a rhetoric 
(especially when there is data evidencing 
the relatively consistent levels of state 
spending on social protection - see Clarke, 
2008, for example). Rather than the terminal 
decline it is the nature of the strains and 
pressures for the reformation of welfare that 
we suggest require attention and 
explanation. 
 
For us, and for other commentators, this 
reformation process has become shaped by 
the convergence between social protection 
concerns and crime control concerns in a 
development that Hughes (2009) refers to as 
‘hybrid policy making’. This hybrid 
relationship between the two sets of 
concerns emerges directly from the 
inevitable failure of the modernist cradle-to-
grave welfarism to deliver full social 
citizenship. The problematisation of welfare 
recipients borrows directly from old notions 
of dangerous, unruly and deviant poor. The 
focus on an expanded and penalising 
criminal justice system and the juridification 
of civic interactions can be understood as a 
response to the (re)turn to the 
pathologisation and criminalisation of 
poverty. But the convergence also reflects 
the mood of social uncertainty and 
heightened risk which engenders less-
forgiving and tolerant, and more defensive 
and fearful populations demanding penalties 
for, and protection from, those figures and 
populations who appear to threaten from the 
margins and outside. It is in this 
environment, in the Global North and in 
some parts of the Global South, where the 
correlations between increased material 
affluence, increased prison populations and 
increased residence within gated 
communities, all make a grim sort of sense. 
Not insignificantly, the convergence 
between the social welfare and crime 
control domains has also happened during a 
period of intense media-isation of politics 
and policy-making that we noted above. 
Future welfare policy has to contend with 
being generated in a fearful, mistrusting and 
non-consensual public domain. While the 
media needs to be recognised as a key 
welfare policy actor, it is not a 
straightforwardly homogenised rightist and 
conservatively inclined blunt instrument. 
The media can work as an oppositional and 
exposing voice for social change too. What 
is clear, though, is that the media shapes 
welfare imaginations in entangled and 
multiple ways. For example, the idea that 
there are an increasing number of places in 
Britain today which resemble the crime- and 
drug-ridden world of Baltimore captured in 
the widely acclaimed and popular American 
TV drama The Wire, has been given 
political legitimacy by Shadow 
Conservative Home Secretary Chris 
Grayling: 
 
The Wire used to be just a work of fiction 
for British viewers. But under this 
government, in many parts of British 
cities, The Wire has become a part of 
real life in this country too. Far too many 
of those features of what we have always 
seen as a US phenomenon are now to be 
found on the streets of Britain as well. … 
It’s a horrendous portrayal of the 
collapse of civilised life and of human 
despair. Neighbourhoods where drug 
dealing and deprivation is rife. A 
constant threat of robbery to fund drug 
dependency. Communities dogged by 
violence and by violent crime. (Cited in 
Watt & Oliver, 2009) 
 
There is, arguably, some irony in the 
Conservatives drawing on The Wire given 
the programme’s indictment of a racially 
polarised, impoverished, deeply divided 
urban United States characterised by an 
almost complete absence of welfare 
intervention and widespread corruption and 
compromise within the range of social 
governance systems. It is various characters’ 
attempts to survive - and prosper - within a 
context of structural and social-spatial 
inequalities that are core to The Wire’s 
storylines. We do not want to over-claim the 
way in which the popularity of The Wire 
reflects the wider ‘real world’ social 
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concerns with welfare and social division, 
social disorder and economic disadvantage 
but it is clear that such programmes do tap 
into anxieties and arguments about what 
constitutes effective and legitimate social 
provision and what effectively creates social 
stability and inclusion in worlds which are 
lived in globally and locally. The popularity 
of The Wire may also be seen to reflect the 
proximity (and sometimes strange 
relationships) between the crime control and 
social welfare worlds (Cochrane & Talbot, 
2008). For example, in the world of The 
Wire, it is police officers who sometimes 
offer welfare care, attempt radical drugs 
policies and where drug dealing systems are 
more effectively dealt with by the Robin 
Hood-esque figure of a gay gangster. But, 
these fictional twists aside, expressions of 
concern as to the well-being and stability of 
a society, it is the levels of social deviancy 
and criminality that present particular 
cornerstones of welfare imaginings and pre-
occupations as we shall see in the next 
section. 
 
Britain as a ‘broken society’: old 
wine in new bottles? 
 
First popularised by Iain Duncan Smith and 
the Conservatives’ Centre for Social Justice 
(CSJ) and regularly deployed by David 
Cameron, the sound bite label ‘Broken 
Britain’ and the broader notion of a ‘broken 
society’ has succeeded in entering wider and 
popular discourses about the social and 
moral state of the contemporary UK 
(Mooney, 2009). As with earlier anti-
welfare narratives - such as Charles 
Murray’s identification of a welfare-created 
and a welfare-dependent ‘underclass’ - part 
of the potency and pervasiveness of the 
broken society idea is that it is a very 
flexible notion, able to be deployed as an 
explanation of a range of social problems 
and popular social ills. It also speaks to the 
anxieties and fears highlighted above. In the 
hands of the Conservative Party, however, 
there is a clear argument that the broken 
society has its roots in ‘broken families’. 
Teenage pregnancies and increasing 
numbers of one-parent households caught, 
of course, in a ‘dependency culture’, feature 
prominently in this account. The institution 
of the family and approaches to families 
become a key site for political and policy 
argument and a target for policy formation. 
For example, while, for the CSJ, there are 
five poverty ‘drivers’: family breakdown, 
welfare dependency, educational failure, 
addiction to drugs and alcohol and serious 
personal debt, as is clear from the CSJ’s 
report Every Family Matters (2009), 
marriage and a stable two-parent family life 
are key to mending Broken Britain and 
thereby reducing levels of poverty. 
 
The idea that family life in Britain is 
increasingly dysfunctional provides the 
ground for a renewed familialism, with the 
Conservatives promising to bring back some 
recognition of marriage to the UK tax 
system if they win the 2010 general 
election. However, such familialism - that 
is, the idea that individual and public well-
being are enabled through support for 
heterosexual nuclear families - are far from 
being a stock-in-trade of the Conservatives 
alone. New Labour has long made a 
distinction between ‘hard working families’ 
and others which are clearly not seen as 
such. More recently, Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, in his 2009 Labour Party 
Conference speech and thereafter, spoke of 
‘problem’, ‘chaotic’ and ‘dysfunctional’ 
families, 50,000 of which are seemingly a 
primary source of anti-social and other 
assorted deviant behaviours across the UK. 
But such familialism is finding renewed 
echoes elsewhere within political and 
policy-making networks. For example, in 
late 2009, political think tank Demos 
announced its latest project, ‘Building 
Character’: 
 
Demos is building the case for 
‘character’ as the key to life chances. 
Rather than seeing character capabilities 
– like empathy, application, and self-
regulation – as ‘soft skills’ to boost 
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young people’s chances in the work 
place or build pro-social behaviour in 
our communities, we should see them as 
key, foundational capacities which 
underpin children’s future development 
in every area. … We find that a 
combination of warmth, responsiveness, 
and consistent discipline leads to the 
development of strong character 
capabilities in children and that these 
qualities are best measured through 
proximal, micro-level interactions 
between parent and child in the home. 
Children essentially learn empathy, self-
regulation, and application through 
interaction with trusted, loving adults. 
We also find that while traditional 
disadvantage – poverty, family structure, 
and educational background – still 
impinges on parents’ ability to parent 
well, these effects are mediated and 
knocked out when parents possess high 
levels of competence, confidence, and 
self-belief: parenting is as much about 
parents’ perception of their own ability 
as it is about their different backgrounds, 
dis/advantages, and particular 
circumstances. (Demos, 2009: 
http://www.demos.co.uk/projects/buildin
gcharactertwo.) 
 
At the subsequent launch of the Demos 
Commission on Character in January 2010, 
Labour MP and ever eager welfare reformer 
Frank Field commented: 
 
The major reason why Britain is rougher 
and more uncivilised than it was in the 
early post-war period has been the 
collapse of the politics of character. 
These politics dominated the debate from 
the mid-Victorian period up until the 
middle of the last century. … The politics 
of character were hugely successful. 
England was transformed from a rough, 
uncouth and often cruel nation, into the 
modern age where citizens treated other 
people as they wished to be treated 
themselves. … Look at Geoffrey Gorer’s 
classic work ‘Explaining English 
Character’ that was published in 1955. I 
agree with his analysis. It is totally 
wrong to claim that we were always a 
civilised nation. Far from it. But we did 
become a nation transformed. … How? 
Gorer sets out to explain how this 
dramatic transformation took place. 
There are many subtleties to his 
argument. But he stressed one influence 
above all others. 
 
England fell in love with becoming a 
nation of good parents. Child rearing 
practices were transformed. … English 
parents, in increasing numbers, learned 
the art of how to live together as a 
family. By this route we also learned 
those qualities necessary to negotiate 
successfully a life in the wider 
community. Awarding respect to others 
became intimately bound up with gaining 
our own self respect. … There can be no 
serious discussion about character 
separate from the role of families. 
Families are the crucible within which – 
for good or ill – character is forged. 
(Frank Field, January 11, 2010: available 
at: http://www.politics.co.uk/mps/press-
releases/party-politics/labour/demos-of-
launch-of-its-commission-on-character-
$1352720.htm.) 
 
While the political positions and the 
terminology differ around ‘broken societies’ 
and ‘problem populations’, what is broadly 
shared here is an emphasis on individual 
and family responsibility but, importantly, 
there is talk too of a need to encourage a 
revival of community ‘spirit’, civic 
interaction and mutuality. The deliberations 
and arguments about the reformations of 
welfare are not about the ending of welfare 
or no welfare. Nor are they completely 
about individualisation. There is a concern 
with social cohesion and stability. 
 
This means that welfare reformation is 
likely to continue to look to a set of 
principles and policy approaches in which 
welfare is highly conditional and aims for 
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social inclusion (primarily through various 
work activation schemes) and not social 
equality. Welfare policy formations and 
interventions are likely to continue to work 
around an agenda that is to enable those on 
the margins of societies to maximise their 
resources for self-reliance and care. They 
will intend to provide opportunities for 
improvement - rather than solutions – and, 
the efficacy of these initiatives will rely 
largely on punitivity as these two headlines 
illustrate: ‘Get treatment or lose benefits, 
drug users told’ (The Guardian, February 
27, 2008) and ‘‘Idle’ jobless could be 
denied council home’ (The Telegraph, 
February 2, 2008). 
 
It is unlikely that there will be a return to a 
reliance on the centre to provide welfare in 
the UK. Welfare delivery providers will 
almost inevitably continue to work through 
decentralised systems and multi- and inter-
agency approaches and public-private 
partnerships. In other words, the neo-
liberalism of anti/state-based welfare 
remains. However, in the welfare reforming 
languages of both New Labour and the 
Conservatives, there is evidence of a 
collectivist sympathy in the shape of the 
calls made to (and for) more community-
ness, the potential of the role of social 
capital and the necessity of civic citizenship. 
As we have argued elsewhere, the demands 
being made on the concept of community 
are many and wide and are likely to 
continue, as community becomes the 
modality through which social welfare 
provision and crime control strategies are to 
be conceived, designed and delivered 
(Mooney & Neal, 2009). While we have 
noted the strange paradox of identifying 
‘problem populations’ through a notion of 
community – recall, for example, David 
Cameron’s condemnation of the whole 
estate in which Karen Mathews lived – we 
agree with Graham Day (2006, p.233) that 
“there is no sign that the term community is 
going to go away either from the discourse 
of ‘ordinary’ people or from the rhetoric of 
those who seek to govern and manage 
them”. 
 
If individualism, self-help and privatised 
welfare systems, family and community are 
to remain at the heart of welfare reformation 
agendas and flourish as the conceptual 
architecture for social security (in its 
broadest sense), we would like to finish with 
what the quote from Day highlights - the 
ways in which ordinary people imagine and 
work with notions of community, welfare, 
senses of entitlement, social care and 
mutuality. 
 
Conclusion: welfare resistances in 
welfare reformation 
 
We have argued that the directions of 
welfare provision in the future UK are likely 
to remain focused on social welfare defined 
by and delivered through a stable of 
regulative concepts such as individualism, 
responsibility and social order. We have 
also suggested that the convergent 
relationship that has emerged, in the UK and 
beyond, between social welfare and crime 
control worlds and which has resulted in 
hybrid welfare-crime policy-making and 
enabling-penalising welfare discourses is 
here to stay. The broken society discourse of 
welfare (in any of its guises) offers no sign 
of any alternative approaches to welfare 
reformation coming from Cameron’s 
Conservative Party. In the UK and globally, 
existing high levels of social fear, division 
and corresponding forms of social retreat 
into defensible, surveilled territory such as 
gated residencies are likely to lead to an 
intensification of the search for security and 
greater social polarisation. 
 
However, we have noted that we are not 
witnessing the terminal decline and end of 
welfare but, rather, complex and uncertain 
processes of shift and reformation. In these 
processes, an emphasis is being given to 
civic interaction, neighbourliness, and 
community. In other words, this is not a 
neo-liberalist, Thatcherite rejection of a 
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thing called ‘society’ but an attempt to call 
on the notion of society through very 
particular and managed modes of collective 
civic responsibility. Minton (2009) 
proposes, in her book Ground Control: Fear 
and Happiness in the Twenty-First Century 
City, that disrupting the drift into social 
retreat and privatisation and challenging the 
ascendancy of cultures of control could be 
most effectively realised by less regulation 
and less control and the reintroduction of 
public space, and an emphasis on sociality 
and convivial interaction. Arguing against 
the privatisation of public spaces in 
American and some UK cities and towns 
under auspices of increasing safety and 
security Minton asks us to look elsewhere: 
 
Imagine trying to privatize a piazza. So 
many genuinely public places in towns 
and cities all over southern and northern 
Europe, in Italy, Spain, Greece, France, 
Holland, Germany and Scandinavia are 
thriving. Families and groups of people 
stroll arm and arm taking the 
passeggiata, children run around and old 
people sit together on benches. These 
places do not follow the American Clean 
and Safe agenda of the shopping mall, 
but they are not dirty and dangerous as a 
result. Far from it, they are happy and 
healthier’ (2009, p.196) 
 
Minton’s arguments for more public-ness 
and more public spaces through which to 
re/create this as a way of building trust and 
civic interaction and care are not unique – 
nor straightforwardly unproblematic. The 
deep and enduring structural divisions that 
create and sustain patterns of social 
inequalities may require more than 
reinvigorated senses and spaces of public-
ness. Nevertheless, the need to find ways to 
counter and challenge spatial and social 
polarisation and segregations is clearly 
important and likely, we would contend, to 
be crucial for imagining different, less 
punitive and less regulatory forms of 
welfare provision. 
 
These are agency-based processes that are 
taking place anyway. Social welfare 
workers continue to struggle for better 
service provision and more investment, or 
fight to defend provision which is under 
attack, at times alongside a range of social 
welfare movements (Mooney & Law, 2007; 
Annetts et al., 2009). Social welfare across 
the UK is a key arena around which the 
market driven and punitive political projects 
of recent times come to be contested. 
Further, people are not passive subjects and 
recipients of welfare policy. Personal lives 
and stories and events interact in more 
iterative and non-linear ways than are 
sometimes imagined. In the often turbulent 
and contested worlds of policy-making and 
politics welfare policy reformations are not 
straightforwardly top-down nor hermetically 
sealed from political pressures and strains. 
The ordinary lives and everyday acts of 
social citizenship do impact on the ways in 
which welfare is experienced and lived. 
Whether these are unremarkable, everyday 
micro acts of kindness, social care and 
resourcefulness (that Power & Willmot, 
2007, have found in their research in very 
different housing estates in Leeds and East 
London) or more organised community- or 
grassroots-based activism and lobbying for 
local social resources and/or services 
(Taylor, 2003) or more explicit forms of 
political organisation and campaigning on a 
range of environmental, social justice, social 
harm concerns and issues or, even more 
dramatically, outbreaks of social unrest 
(Benyon, 1987), all of them contribute to 
unpredictable and unfixed welfare worlds 
and thereby more open welfare futures. 
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